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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IT’S THE 21ST CENTURY. . .TIME FOR PROBATE CODES TO
ADDRESS FAMILY VIOLENCE: A PROPOSAL THAT DEALS WITH
THE REALITIES OF THE PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION
It is an understatement that family violence is one of our nation’s most
pressing problems. In general, the relationships within our families are the
first ones we know and often remain the most personal. “It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural.”1 The hidden tragedy of family violence is not the physical
bruises that may develop and eventually will go away, but rather it is the
emotional beating that will continue for the rest of a victim’s lifetime. Family
violence destroys or disfigures these precious personal relationships and this
everlasting effect, taken as a collective whole, often carries over into other
aspects of our society.2
In the past thirty years, our society has begun to recognize the severity and
ugliness of family violence.3 The invisible walls created by the sanctity of
1. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
2. Marva Bledsoe, Domestic Violence is a Serious Problem, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 15-18
(Tamara J. Roleff ed., 2000). “The trauma goes beyond the pain of any one episode. Once begun
in a relationship, a pattern of violence will escalate both in frequency and severity. Worse, abuse
in the home today leaves its mark on the future. Family violence is cyclical in nature. . .” Id. at
17. Although batterers are not usually abusive in their work environments or in relationships with
people outside the family, an abusive pattern is likely to exist in relationships with others.
MICHELE HARAWAY & MARSALI HANSEN, SPOUSE ABUSE: ASSESSING & TREATING BATTERED
WOMEN, BATTERERS & THEIR CHILDREN 27 (Patricia Hammond ed., 1994). Further, in 30-70%
of spousal abuse cases there exists child physical or sexual abuse. Id. “. . .The consequences of
domestic violence involve all family members, with children being the unintended victims. . .”
Gayla Margolin, Effects of Domestic Violence On Children, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN
THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY 57 (Penelope K. Trickett et al. eds., 1998). See infra notes 3, 30,
31, 32 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 38. Social-Welfare expenditures by federal and state authorities rose from
less than 12% of the gross national product to 20% from 1965 to 1975. Philip Jenkins, The
Seriousness of Domestic Violence is Exaggerated, in DOMSTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 19,
20.
However, it has been argued that the increase in reports of family violence is not due to
an increase in abusive behavior, but rather, it is the result of family members recognizing the
increase in availability of protective services and an increase in a willingness to use these
services. Thus, coupled with a very broad definition of abuse, a spiral effect was created. More
services were created, therefore, more incidents were reported and so on. Id. at 19-24. Also
449

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

450

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:449

marriage have been corroded by time and constant pressure from the
intolerance of a growing portion of our society.4 Our legal system has lagged
behind, but recently it has begun to peer through the cracks in those walls and
punish those it finds guilty of family violence.5 However, the legal assault on
family violence has not been unified. Where states have increasingly adopted
criminal statutes against this problem, legislatures in almost all of the fifty
states and the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) have either
neglected or have refused to create family property laws which address family
violence.6 Specifically, only one state has adopted a probate code section that
disqualifies an heir from his or her right to inherit through intestate
succession,7 elective share,8 homestead allowance,9 or any other statutory
allowances10 for a pattern of physical violence directed towards the decedent.11
leading to an exaggerated number of instances of abuse may be laws which were passed to
strengthen these protective services requiring doctors, teachers, etc. to report suspected instances
of family violence. Id.
4. See infra notes 38, 56, 105 and accompanying text.
5. State legislatures have passed penal codes against deaths resulting from patterns of
family violence. See infra note 105.
6. See infra notes 55, 56, and accompanying text.
7. Intestate refers to a person dying without a valid will. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET
AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 12-13 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1997). Intestate
succession is the distribution of the property of an estate in accordance with the appropriate
intestate succession statutes. Id. at 13.
8. Elective share is a spouse’s statutorily created right to take against an existing will of the
deceased spouse. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 526. An elective share may also be
described as a “forced share,” and all but one of the “separate property states” have decided that
surviving spouses need protection from disinheritance. Id. Georgia is currently the only
“separate property state” that does not recognize an elective share. Id. at 526 n.11. As opposed
to “separate property states,” “community property states” do not have an elective share. Id. at
520. These states allow the surviving spouse to own a half interest upon property that was in the
“fruits of marriage.” Id. Since, the surviving spouse has already been taken care of with this
marital property, “community property states” allow complete denotative freedom to the deceased
“over his or her separate or individual property and over his or her half of the community or
marital property.” Id. Only nine states are in effect community property states: Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at
519. Wisconsin’s adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act made it a community property
state. Id. at n.4.
9. Homestead allowance laws give a decedent’s dependant survivors a right to occupy
certain real estate owned by the decedent. Id. at 577-578. These laws vary as to what rights are
given. Compare e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-2803 (2000) (provides for no ceiling on
property value at all) with ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2000) (provides a ceiling of property value of
$30,000) and ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.402 (2000) (providing a homestead allowance of $27,000)
and MO. REV. STAT. § 474.290 (1999) (provides for a ceiling of $15,000). The UPC is very
different than traditional homestead allowances. It provides a money substitute, up to fifteen
thousand dollars, to be given to the surviving spouse and/or issue. U.P.C. § 2-402 (1993).
10. In addition to the homestead allowance a surviving spouse (or surviving children of the
decedent if there is no surviving spouse) has a statutory right to a specified amount of value from
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Although one goal of a probate code and its laws of intestate succession is
to give effect to the probable intent of the deceased, it is common for the UPC
and state legislatures to address public policy issues within their respective
codes.12 An alternative rationale “for adopting a particular distributive pattern

the estate in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal effects. See,
e.g., U.P.C. § 2-403 (1993). Under the U.P.C. this amount may be as much as $10,000. Id. This
allowance is referred to as exempt property.
In addition to a right to exempt property and homestead allowance, a decedent’s
surviving spouse and minor children under the decedent’s support are entitled to an allowance in
money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administration. See e.g.,
U.P.C. § 2-404 (1993). This is entitlement is referred to as a family allowance.
These two statutorily created entitlements of the decedent’s estate are not chargeable
against any benefit or share passing to the recipient through a will, intestate succession, or
elective share. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-403; U.P.C. § 2-404.
Probate codes recognize that situations often change in the time a will is completed and
when a testator dies. Commonly, surviving spouses, who were not included in a premarital will,
and children, who were not born at the time the will was created, are regarded as pretermitted
heirs. Code sections entitle these omitted heirs to receive an interest in the decedent’s estate.
See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-301 (1993) (allowing an omitted spouse an interest in the estate “no less than
the value of the of the share of the estate he [or she] would have received if the testator had died
intestate as to that portion of the estate”); U.P.C. § 2-302 (1993) (entitling an omitted child a
share in the estate). These rights are conditioned upon several situations described within the
statutes. Generally, these statutes will not grant these interests if the intent of the testator was to
leave the heir out of the will and that intent can be shown. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-301 (refusing a
surviving spouse’s entitlement if “(1) it appears from the will or other evidence that the will was
made in contemplation of the testator’s marriage to the surviving spouse; (2) the will expresses
the intention that it is to be effective notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or (3) the testator
provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision is shown by the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the
amount of the transfer or other evidence”).
11. See CA. PROB. CODE ANN. § 259 (2000) (deeming any person, who is “liable for
physical abuse, neglect or fiduciary abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult”
as predeceasing the decedent). This statute is discussed further below. See infra notes 130-135
and accompanying text.
12. Several states have statutes barring an heir from inheritance for specific acts of
misconduct. See infra note 56. These statutes are based more upon the norms of society than
upon the probable intent of the deceased. Id.
The existence of a parent-child relationship is another area where probate codes consider
public policy concerns. The issue of inheritance by dead-beat parents and their families is often
addressed. These statutes are intended to punish parents who do not fulfill their paternal duties as
defined by society. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 (2000) (adopting that even in situations
where paternity has been established it is “ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit
from or through the child, unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused
to support the child”); U.P.C. § 2-114 (c) (1993) (“inheritance from or through a child by either
natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the
child as his [or hers], and has not refused to support the child”). Inheritance by or from an
adopted child is also dealt with by many codes and jurisdictions differ upon the appropriate
method of addressing the public policy issue. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1) (b) (West
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in an intestacy statute is that it serves society’s interests. . . If society’s well
being requires a distributive pattern different from the determined wishes of
intestate decedents, the decedent’s wishes should be subordinated.”13 State
legislatures and the UPC, however, have remained eerily silent on the issue of
family violence.14
Following the lead of Robin L. Preble’s proposed statute against
succession rights of abusive heirs,15 which was the first to address many of the
issues presented in this article, the proposal presented in this article addresses
the issue of family violence and disqualifies abusive heirs from their property
rights received after the death of the battered decedent. However, unlike
Preble’s earlier proposal, the family violence proposal follows the mold that
the UPC and states have used for statutes regarding similar public policy issues

2000) (“adoption of a child by a natural parent’s spouse who married the natural parent after
death of the other natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and the family
of the deceased natural parent”) with PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West 2000) (“an adopted
person shall not be considered as continuing to be the child or issue of his natural parents except
in distributing the estate of a natural kin, other than the natural parent, who has maintained a
family relationship with the adopted person”).
Another example of probate codes applying public policy into intestate succession over
the possible intent of the decedent is in the issue of “half bloods.” Half bloods are descendents
“from one of the decedent’s ancestors, but not from a pair of them.” WAGGONER ET AL., supra
note 7, at 54 n. 35. Throughout the history of the idea of intestate succession, codes have adhered
to the policy that property should stay within the family. Id. at 32. Therefore, family members
who were not within the bloodline of the deceased are generally not considered heirs of the
decedent, except of course the surviving spouse. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 474.010 (2000)
(provides the general rules of descent, but only allows relatives of non-blood to take property if
the estate is going to escheat to the state); U.P.C. § 2-103 (1993) (allows the estate to escheat
before non-bloods, other than the surviving spouse, can take property through intestation). In a
minority of jurisdictions, this policy of keeping property within the decedent’s bloodline is
applied very literally to half bloods. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.105 (2000) (adopting that when
part of the collaterals are of the whole blood and part is of half blood, “those of half blood shall
only inherit only half as much as those of the whole blood”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 474.040
(2000); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41 (West 1999). But see e.g., ALA. STAT. § 43-8-46 (2000)
(“Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole
blood”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2107 (2000) (providing no descent differences between half
bloods and whole bloods); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 506 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 5328 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-107 (1999).
13. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 324. “There are
four identifiable community aims: (1) to protect the financially dependent family; (2) to avoid
complicating property titles and excessive subdivision of property; (3) to promote and encourage
the nuclear family; and (4) to encourage the accumulation of property by individuals.” Id.
14. See infra notes 55, 56. But see supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
15. Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal For Reform, 13
LAW & INEQ 401 (1995).
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and employs a clear and convincing evidentiary standard.16 This standard
guarantees fairness and justice to the accused batterer, but also recognizes the
realities of family violence and the tendency for silence to reign over the
family.
One of most troublesome side effects of family abuse is the family’s
reluctance to involve and notify outsiders of the abuser’s actions.17 This
silence on its face seems unexplainable, but experts believe that the silence
may be the result of social pressures,18 fear for physical safety,19 fear of losing
their family,20 and psychological effects resulting from the abusive situation.21
Regardless of the cause for a victim’s reluctance to ask for help, his or her
silence cannot be ignored and must be incorporated into a statute against the
attainment of family property rights by an abuser from a deceased victim.
The higher burden of proof upon the accuser protects the wrongfully
accused,22 but it allows a wide range of evidence to be admitted into court.23
The scope of admissible evidence is not limited to existing civil or criminal
records of the benefiting family members. Even though the existence of these
things would weigh heavily with the court, the proposal is written with the
understanding that many instances of family violence go unreported. If abuse
goes undetected by traditional legal means, it does not change the fact that it
existed and destroyed the lives of the victims. When attempting to confront
family violence, a statute should not ignore acts because they go legally
unreported.
Part two of this article will discuss the problem of family violence in our
society more specifically. Included in this discussion will be the causes and
effects of the shroud of silence that may exist. Also included in the second
16. Id. at 412-417. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993) (states that writings intended as wills
must be established by clear and convincing evidence); U.P.C. § 2-104 (1993) (requires that an
heir survive the decedent for 120 hours must be established by clear and convincing evidence);
U.P.C. § 2-507 (c) and (d) (1993) (creates presumptions that the testator intended a subsequent
will to replace a prior will or merely to supplement an already existing will are created if the
subsequent will makes a complete disposition of the testator’s estate or not, unless it is rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence). See, e.g., ALA. STAT. § 26-17-5 (2000) (allowing a
presumption of paternity to only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence); ALASKA STAT. §
13.12.104 (2000) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that an heir survives the decedent by
120 hours); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 (2) (2) (2000) (applying a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard to establish paternity after the death of the father); GA. STAT § 53-3-6 (2000)
(allowing a presumption of an intent to revoke a will rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence). See proposed statute section (A).
17. See infra notes 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 100 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 39, 40.
19. See infra note 46, 47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 41, 42, 44.
21. See infra note 49, 50.
22. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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section of this article will be an examination of the current systems regulating
family property rights and their inadequacies. Part three will contain the
proposed statute and the advantages it offers. Further, part three will compare
the proposal to ones made in the past, and in particular it will explain and
support the presence of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. Part four
of this article will provide examples of support for a change and discredit
arguments against it. Part five concludes that not only a statute that addresses
family violence is needed, but also it cannot ignore the reality that many acts of
violence are legally unreported. The purpose of this article is not only to make
a proposal that will address family violence in regards to family property
rights, but also to do so in a way that is practical and addresses the entire
problem. The statute recognizes it is important not to exclude the many
families that have been torn apart by family violence, but have not yet taken
legal action.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand why a statute barring inheritance rights for a pattern
of family violence is needed it is necessary to examine the problem of family
violence in the United States and to discuss the inadequacies of the current
approaches employed by all fifty states.
A.

The Realities of Family Violence

“The American family and the American home are perhaps as or more
violent than any other single American institution or setting. . . Americans run
the greatest risks of assault, physical injury, and even murder in their own
homes by members of their own families.”24 A person is battered by his or her
spouse or cohabitator every fifteen seconds in the United States and one in four
murders involves family relationships.25 Some studies report that 3.8 to 8.7
million couples experience violence and that family violence “is the single
major cause of injuries to women, more than stranger rapes, muggings, and
automobile accidents combined.”26
Children and other family members are also affected by family violence.
Children who grow up in violent homes create violent environments within
their subsequent families, and children who are abused are more likely to be

24. MURRAY A. STRAUS, ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 4 (1st ed., 1980).
25. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 16.
26. HARRAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 22-23 (recognizing that the number of incidents
varies due to different definitions of battering and samples selected).
Not all family violence is perpetrated by the husband or father, males constitute five
percent of the victims of spousal abuse. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 16; see infra note 37.
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violent towards their parents and other siblings.27 These unfortunate effects
are magnified by the fact that the number of children reported as abused or
neglected in the United States grew by thirty-three percent during the 1990’s
and it is estimated that over 1,071,000 children were abused in 1999.28 Sadly,
abuse often occurs before the child is even born because acts of family
violence do not cease when the battered women is pregnant.29
The walls of the home do not effectively contain the dangerous
consequences of family violence, they can be observed in other areas of our
society. Availability of emergency hospital care must be a concern when onethird of all visits are “domestic violence-related.”30 Ultimately, our economy
is significantly affected by the three to five billion dollars of economic loss
created by “abuse-related absenteeism” from work.31 This high number does
not include the one hundred million dollars spent on medical expenses
resulting from domestic assaults per year.32 We can no longer afford to view
family violence as the family’s private problem.
It is hard to point to one factor that has contributed the most in allowing
family violence to become such a plague on our society. Certainly alcohol,
drugs33 and the male dominance in our society34 have contributed to the
27. RICHARD J. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 21 (2nd ed., 1987). “Sixty-three percent of
boys ages 11-20 who commit homicide kill the man who is beating their mother.” Bledsoe, supra
note 2, at 16. Male children within a family where their father abuses their mother are “700 times
more likely to use violence in their own lives.” Lenore Walker, The Battered Women Syndrome
Defense, in BATTERED WOMEN 82, 86 (Louise Gerdes ed., 1999).
28. Prevent Child Abuse America, Reports of Child Abuse & Neglect Grew 33 Percent in the
1990’s (March 13, 2001), available at http://www.preventchildabuse.org/media/
03_13_01_3.html.
29. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 25. Twenty-five percent of all battered women are
abused during their pregnancy. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 16. “Researchers describe the high
incidence of battering during pregnancy as being the result of the batterer’s frustration that
someone other than himself (the growing fetus) has an impact on her.” HARAWAY ET AL., supra
note 2, at 25.
30. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 17.
31. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 16; It was estimated that in 1980, 175,500 workdays were lost
due to acts of family violence. GELLES, supra note 27, at 13; Violence against women has
several effects upon our nations economy. Johanna R. Shargel, Federal Protection: The Violence
Against Women Act, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 75, 77 –78. These effects include:
lost productivity in the work place, increased healthcare and security costs, higher turnover rates
and depredation of employment opportunities caused by fear of abuse. Id.
32. Bledsoe, supra note 2, at 16.
33. Many batterers are alcoholics, but this cannot be used as an excuse for their violence.
Researchers have found that after a batterer is treated for alcoholism he or she remains violent
towards their spouse. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 26. Research further indicates that
abusers tend to do most of their battering while they are sober. Id. However, it may be argued
that substance abuse is a cause of family violence. Jerry P. Flanzer, Alcohol Abuse Causes
Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 54. “The Violent perpetrator,
stressed by AOD [alcohol or other drug], is less likely to be able to manage anxiety in the
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problem, but our society’s historic view on family violence definitely has been
a significant factor.35 For most of the twentieth century, courts and prosecutors
“did not believe that formal prosecution was appropriate and that rehabilitation
was the goal.”36 This belief was supported by the attitude of community
members who were hesitant to enter into a “private matter of the family.”37
However, since the 1970’s there has been considerable pressures to take a
different approach and many states have adopted criminal statutes against
family violence.38
A particular question that often arises is why doesn’t the battered
individual say or do something to prevent the abuse. The fact is that many
victims attempt to leave, but several factors make it hard to do so
successfully.39 One reason victims of family violence stay with the abuser is a
external world and, supported by the external world’s acceptance of violence, more likely to
exacerbate his or her dysfunctional behavior. He or she will drink more and hit more.” Id. at 62.
34. This feminist perspective is based upon the idea that men have held higher positions
within society for centuries, and have kept them by subordinating women. Loretta J. Stalans &
Arthur J. Lurigio, Two Perspectives on Domestic Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27,
at 15, 18-19. In this Perspective, domestic violence is seen as another way of gaining and
maintaining control over the less powerful women and children of the family. Id. Support for
this perspective may be seen in study results that show that twenty percent of Americans believe
that on appropriate occasions it is acceptable to hit a spouse. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at
27. In fact, the expression “the rule of thumb” is derived from English case law providing a
husband the right to hit his wife with a rod no wider than the width of a thumb. Barbera J. Hart,
The Legal Road to Freedom, in BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE,
13, 14 (Marsali Hansen & Michele Haraway eds., 1993).
35. Stalans et al., supra note 34, at 19-20. Husbands used the excuse of chastisement until
the nineteenth century when laws were passed to punish offenders of spousal abuse. These laws
were created on the notion that “the moral sense of the community revolts at the idea that the
husband may inflict personal chastisement upon his wife, even for the most outrageous conduct.”
Id. at 19. These laws were rarely effective at dissuading acts of violence committed against one’s
spouse because they were rarely enforced. Id.
36. Id. Domestic violence was considered a matter to be kept out of public view. Statutes
were created that did not allow police to arrest a suspected abuser unless the act of violence was
witnessed by an uninterested third party. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 19-20. The woman’s movement of the seventies stressed that spousal abuse was a
public concern and lawsuits were filed against police departments for failure to provide equal
protection to abused women. Id.
39. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2 at 23-24. Statistics indicate that an average of seven
attempts are made to leave the abuser before a victim is successful. Id. However, “when a
battered women leaves her batterer and seeks help from another, inability to obtain emotional
support is the most common reason for returning to the abusive situation.” Id. Too frequently,
victims attempting to leave reach out for friends and relatives only to be told that they should try
harder to make the marriage work. Often helpers do not realize the physical danger that the
abused is in. Id. “Some of the reasons women do not break off relationships with abusive
husbands are that: (1) they do have negative self-concepts; (2) they believe their husbands will
reform; (3) economic hardship; (4) they have children who need a father’s economic support; (5)
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lack of financial resources, which may make the individual dependent upon the
batterer.40
Another reason for the silence is the fear of losing one’s family to the
batterer. Many abusers attempt to get custody of any children a couple may
have as an attempt to remain in psychological control over the victim and
courts often oblige.41 Eighty-five percent of the time women receive custody,
but this is due largely to the fact that fathers often do not contest them.42 A
1989 Massachusetts state government report showed that in seventy percent of
the cases where fathers did contest giving the mother full custody, judges
granted sole custody to the father or joint custody.43 Many states have passed
laws that require judges to apply substantial weight to incidents of family
violence in the determination of custody, but many judges frequently dismiss
they doubt they can get along alone; (6) they believe divorcees are stigmatized; and (7) it is
difficult for women with children to get work.” GELLES, supra note 27, at 109 (summarizing the
findings in E. Truninger Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259-276). Yet
another factor that may keep victims of family violence silent is the private nature of the family.
Id. at 17.
“The question is no longer “why don’t they leave?”. . . The questions now are ‘Why
aren’t they safe when they leave?’ and ‘What can we do to help them stay gone?’” Stephanie
Rodriguez, Is Leaving Better?, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 111, 113.
Sarah Buel, a victim of spousal abuse recalls her difficulties attempting to leave her
abuser, “We go back because we think we’ll figure out a way to stop the violence, the magic
secret everybody else seems to know. We don’t want to believe that out marriage or relationship
failed because we weren’t willing to try just a little harder. I felt deeply ashamed, that it must be
my fault. I never heard anyone else talking about it. I assumed I was the only one it was
happening to.” Hara Estroff Marano, From Battered Women to Advocate, in BATTERED WOMEN,
supra note 27, at 121, 125.
Of course men are victims of family violence too and they share many of the same
reasons for not seeking help or leaving their spouse. Phillip W. Cook, Female Violence Against
Men is a Serious Problem, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at 25, 26-28. Abused men
must deal with ridicule and isolation that is different than that witnessed to by women. Id. at 3031. The police may arrive at the scene and laugh about the incident or a man’s male friends or
family members might believe the man did something to deserve the attack. Id. at 30. A man has
fewer places he can turn to for guidance and help because there are “no victim’s advocates, no
crises lines, no support groups, no media recognition, no shelters, and a pervasive attitude that
supports a macho ‘I can handle it. . .I must be the strong and responsible one’ kind of response.”
Id. All of these things prevent a man from “leaving an abusive relationship, or even
acknowledging it.” Id.
40. Rodriguez, supra note 39, at 112. “We trade our poverty for safety. We go back
because we don’t know what else to do.” Marano, supra note 39, at 124.
41. Id.; Catherine Elton, Why Courts Award Batterers Custody, in BATTERED WOMEN,
supra note 27, at 87. “It is in fact common for judges to grant fathers who abuse their wives—
even fathers convicted of murdering their wives—custody of their children.” Id. According to
the American Psychological Association, husbands who batter their spouses are twice as likely to
seek custody as non-abusive husbands. Id. at 88.
42. Id. at 87-88.
43. Id.; Marano, supra note 39 at 124.
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them based upon the “remarkable belief” that there is no connection between
violence directed towards a spouse and violence towards their children.44 In
actuality, this belief is in direct conflict with research that shows that forty to
sixty percent of men who beat their wives also beat their children.45
Another powerful reason for victims to remain silent or to stay with their
spouse is fear for their personal safety. Often, the danger of abuse does not
cease after the spouse leaves. The number of violent acts and resulting
murders actually increase when a spouse tries to leave.46 Unlike incidents of
violence from strangers, victims of family violence often cannot completely
cut ties with the abuser.47 Children play a major role in this continued contact,
because courts often grant joint custody.48
Perhaps the strongest wall, which a battered family member must tear
down before he or she may confront the abuser, is the psychological effect
created by the abuse itself. Victims often become isolated from peers, family
members, and the batterer becomes the emotional support for that person,
achieving the control that they so desperately desired.49 One theory suggests
that women in marriages consumed by family violence have much less self-

44. Elton, supra note 41, at 88. A majority of states have passed legislation requiring judges
to examine incidents of domestic violence in determining custody. Id. Several states legislation
creates a presumption that it is not in the child’s well being to be placed in the custody of an
abuser. Id.
45. Id.
46. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2 at 30; Rodiguez, supra note 39, at 111. The chances of
getting murdered increase seventy-five percent after an abused women leaves the battering
husband. Id. The reason for this astonishing fact is that “Most men who batter are terrified at the
thought of separation, and they continue to stalk and harass their victims even after the women
leave.” Walker, supra note 27, at 86. When victims of spousal abuse attempt to leave, abusers
“desperately escalate tactics of control.” Marano, supra note 39, at 125.
47. Stalens et al., supra note 34, at 16-17; See Beth Sipe, A Deadly Confrontation, in
BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 114.
48. Id.; see supra notes 41, 42, 43, 44 and accompanying text.
49. HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 62-63; Susan Brewster, Families and Friends Must
Recognize the Danger, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 63, 64-65.
One nightmarish example of a victim’s loss of control is the story of Hedda Nussbaum. Tamara
Jones, The Women Who Cannot Stop Crying, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 102.
Nussbaum was a victim of atrocious violence for 12 years, and her emotional scars have still not
healed. Id. The physical beatings stopped after one last fit of violence and the unfortunate death
of the couple’s adopted child, but Nussbaum has had to deal with people’s beliefs that she was to
blame for not protecting her child. The prosecutor, however, felt that she could not be held
accountable in the violent environment that had been created. Id. at 103. When Nussbaum was
mentally examined, she was compared to that of “a hostage or prisoner of war, robbed of her free
will and grasp of reality by a tormentor whose approval had come to mean everything to her.” Id.
at 104. Even while lying in the hospital with brain injuries the only thing that Nussbaum could
think of was the fate of her attacker. Id.
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confidence than women who are in marriages free from violence.50 The
repeated beatings cause the abused spouse to feel as if they have lost control
over what happens to them.51
Regardless of the exact reason why a particular abused member of a family
does not seek help or successfully leaves the abuser, the law should not neglect
the rights of these individuals and fail to provide some form of protection. The
sheer magnitude of the problem of family violence demands that more needs to
be done in all aspects of our society. There should be an increase in legal
protections besides criminal statutes. State legislatures should no longer
condone family violence, as they did for much of our nation’s history,52 by
allowing the recognition of succession rights in the abused decedent’s estate.
B.

The Inadequacy of The Current Systems Employed

Although each state has its own system of property descent, when it comes
to the disqualification of succession rights, they all can be put into two general
categories: UPC states and non-UPC states.53 These categories are divided on
their approach to disqualifying spouses from property rights based upon
particular patterns of misconduct.54 The UPC and a majority of states do not
disqualify heirs because of misconduct. Only “distinct legal acts” that dissolve

50. GELLES, supra note 27 at 122-24. The theory of “learned helplessness,” developed by
Lenore Walker, is derived from experiments involving laboratory animals subjected to electronic
shocks, for which the animal is powerless to control or escape. Eventually, it is learned that they
are helpless to avoid the attacks. Id. at 123. It is important, however, to note that victims of
family violence are not to be confused with lab rats in experiments. These individuals are not as
passive and many try to leave. Id. People are more complicated, many victims “stay, leave, and
return.” Id.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 35, 36, 37 and accompanying text.
53. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 81-82. It is interesting to note that neither group
disqualifies an heir for acts of misconduct other than the surviving spouse or dead-beat parent.
See supra notes 55, 56. The exception is the rule of law followed by almost all jurisdictions that
a murderer of the decedent cannot profit from their wrong. See infra notes 106, 108. “In some
respects, homicide is just another in the list of reprehensible acts that result in forfeiture because
denying an heir the right to take accords with the community’s sense of justice and likely reflects
the decedent’s dispositive preference.” WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 462. However,
homicide is different from other wrongful conduct because of its nexus with the transfer of the
property. Inheritance is based upon who dies first, this conduct directly affects this idea and
therefore courts have barred an otherwise proper heir from taking property even without statutory
authority. Id.
54. Generally these acts of misconduct do not include incidents of family violence. See infra
note 56. But see CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 259 (West, WESTLAW through 1999-2000 Reg.
Sess.) (barring succession rights based upon acts of violence upon an elder or dependent adult);
see infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
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the family, such as divorce and legal separation may disqualify an heir.55
However, a handful of states recognize that an individual’s conduct may
disqualify them from their inheritance rights.56 These states generally look at
acts that constitute abandonment of the family or neglect to the decedent.57
The rationale used to support these statutes is that these instances of
misconduct in effect voluntarily dissolve the marriage and therefore the
abandoning spouse does not deserve to inherit from or through the deserted

55. See, e.g., UPC § 2-802 (1990) (comments state, “although some existing statutes bar the
surviving spouse for desertion or adultery, the present section requires some definite legal act to
bar the surviving spouse”); WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 81.
56. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 392.090 (Banks-Baldwin 2000) (spouse barred if spouse
“leaves the other and lives in adultery,” unless the spouses “afterward become reconciled and
liver together as husband and wife”); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.140 (2000) (spouse barred “if
[husband] voluntarily leaves his spouse and goes away and continues to live with an adulterer or
abandons his spouse without reasonable cause and continues to live separate and apart from his
spouse for one whole year next proceeding death, or dwells with another in a state of adultery
continuously, or if any wife after being ravished consents to her ravisher. . . unless such spouse is
voluntarily reconciled to him and resumes cohabitation with him.”); EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-1.2(a) (5) (6) (McKinney 2000) (spouse barred if spouse “abandoned the deceased
spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of death” or if the spouse “who, having
the duty to support the other spouse, failed or refused to provide for such spouse though he or she
had the means to do so, unless such marital duty was resumed and continued until the death of the
surviving spouse having the need of support”; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:19 (2000) (spouse
barred “if at the time of the death of either the husband or wife, the decedent was justifiably living
apart from the surviving husband or wife because such survivor was or had been guilty of conduct
which constitutes cause for divorce”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-1(a) (3) (b) (2000) (spouse barred
if “willfully and without just cause abandons and refuses to live with the other spouse and is not
living with the other spouse at the time of such spouse’s death”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2106 (a)
(West 2000) (spouse barred if “for one year or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse,
has willfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or who for one
year or upwards has willfully and maliciously deserted the other spouse”); VA. CODE § 64.1-16.3
(A) (2000) (spouse barred if “willfully deserts or abandons his or her spouse and such desertion
or abandonment continues until the death of the spouse”).
The California legislature has adopted a probate code section that does examine acts of
violence, but, as discussed below, it is not necessarily concerned with family abuse. The
language of the statute limits its applicability to family abuse situations. See infra notes 130-135
and accompanying text.
Many jurisdictions will disqualify a parent for in effect neglecting and abandoning their
child by refusing to support them and openly acknowledging the child as theirs. See infra note
141.
57. See supra note 56. See generally 13 A.L.R. 3rd 446-451 (1967) (discussing the
forfeiture of rights of dower.).
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spouse.58 Yet, these statutes ignore the dividing effect violence has on the
family.59
In light of the vast majority of state probate codes ignoring the issue of
family violence,60 our society relies upon two legal actions to disinherit an
abusive family member: a divorce or a disinheriting will. However, these two
means of dealing with abusive heirs are ineffective because often they are
impractical.
The difficulties of speaking out or leaving an abusive family member were
discussed above,61 but under our current system that is exactly what our laws
are requiring victims to do in order to bar succession rights of the abusive
spouse.62 Moreover, divorce only deals with part of the problem; it is
ineffective when violence involves a child decedent. The divorced parent’s
ties to the children from the marriage still exist, and the parent or his kindred
may still inherit from or through a deceased child. Also, divorce has
absolutely no effect upon family members on the victim spouse’s side and may
actually reward the abusive family member.63 Since, divorce is often not an
option for a victim and does not affect the pattern of family violence from
other members of the family besides a spouse, relying upon divorce to deal
with family violence is not a wise decision.
One solution to the issue of succession rights and family violence is for the
victim to create a will disinheriting the abuser. However, this solution fails
because in too many cases it just does not occur.64 Many people die without a

58. See generally 48 A.L.R. 4th 972 § 13(a) 1050-57 (1986) (examining various court
decisions applying elective share forfeiture statutes.). See also supra note 56.
59. See supra notes 27-30. However, there is some evidence of courts examining family
abuse to determine that “constructive abandonment” occurred. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7,
at 82; See infra note 113.
60. See supra note 56.
61. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 55, 56.
63. The divorced spouse is no longer viewed as the surviving spouse. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2802 (1993) (an individual who is divorced from the decedent. . .is not a surviving spouse unless,
by virtue of a subsequent marriage, he [or she] is married to the decedent at the time of death).
See also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-802 (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2353
(2000); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-802 (1999).
An abusive member of the family may be awarded by a divorce between the victim and
his or her spouse. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-103 (1993) (allowing a decedent’s parents to take under
intestate succession if there is no surviving spouse and no descendents of the decedent); MO REV.
STAT § 474.010 (2000) (providing descent to the decedent’s father, mother, brothers, sisters or
their descendents in equal parts if there is no surviving spouse and no descendents of the
decedent); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-1 (Michie 2000) (providing the entire estate to pass to the
surviving parents, brothers and sisters of the decedent if there is no surviving spouse or issue).
64. In almost all non-UPC states have made eighteen the minimum age requirement for the
creation of a will. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 220. Therefore, this “solution” to family
abuse is not even available to children.
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will and their property passes through intestacy.65 One study reported that
eighty-seven percent of individuals under the age of thirty and sixty-five
percent of people under the age of forty-five do not have wills.66 Estate size
and family income play great roles in who creates a will. In estates smaller
than $129,000, seventy-two percent did not have a will controlling their
distribution.67 This becomes a problem when one examines the possible
effects of “pro-spouse” distribution jurisdictions.68 For example, under
jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC, in an estate valued under $200,000, an
abusive spouse could easily receive the entire estate.69 Many jurisdictions
make sure that the spouse is taken care of first before any property is
transferred to any other family members.70 Normally, this idea of providing
for the surviving spouse may be seen as a good social policy, but in the case of
an abusive surviving spouse and a small estate this amicable goal is perverted
into a policy that supports a behavior that destroys and terrorizes the family.
It is not easy to explain why victimized people do not make wills
disinheriting an abusive heir. The best explanation probably lies in a
combination of human nature and economics. It can be classified as human
nature not to want to talk about one’s own death, and that is exactly what one
is doing when they are preparing a will. No one enjoys thinking about what is
going to happen when his or her time comes to leave this world, and people

65. Id. at 29-32. Will substitutes, such as joint bank accounts, life insurance, revocable
trusts and joint tenancies in property, may contribute to the number of individuals without wills.
Will substitutes are designed to avoid probate and are out of the scope of the proposed family
abuse statute.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Pro-spouse jurisdictions provide a large sum of money to the surviving spouse before
anyone else is allowed a portion of the intestate estate. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.102
(Michie 2000) (depending upon which heirs survive the decedent, the surviving spouse can take
the entire estate, the first $200,000 and three-fourths of any remaining balance, the first $150,000
and one-half of any balance, or the first $100,000 and one-half of any balance of the intestate
estate); But see 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1 (West 2000) (allowing the surviving spouse the
entire estate if there are no descendents of the decedent, but one-half of the intestate estate if there
exists any descendents of the decedent); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214 (Michie 1999) (requiring
property to pass first to the children of the intestate and second if the intestate is survived by no
descendant, to the intestate’s surviving spouse unless the intestate and such surviving spouse had
been continuously married less than three (3) years next preceding the death of the intestate, in
which event the surviving spouse will take merely fifty percent (50%) of the intestate’s heritable
estate”).
69. See U.P.C. § 2-102 (1993) (“providing the surviving spouse “the first $200,000, plus
three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate, if no descendent of the decedent survives the
decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent”).
70. Id.; see, e.g., MO REV. STAT.§ 474.010 (2000) (“the first twenty thousand dollars in
value of the intestate estate, plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate, if there are
surviving issue all of whom are also issue of the surviving spouse”). See also supra note 68.
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may rationalize procrastination by convincing themselves that there will be
time to make a will later in life. Often, people die before they plan to, and as a
result they do not possess a will.
A person’s economic situation may play a big role in whether or not he or
she creates a will. Perhaps they feel that they have nothing of value to leave
their heirs and the little they do have will find its way to the ones they want to
have it. Many people may not have the money to hire an attorney to draft a
will. Valid wills must follow strict formalities to be given effect.71 The
formalities required may differ within each jurisdiction, but most follow a
doctrine of “strict compliance.”72 These formalities may not be known by a
layperson and therefore an attorney’s expertise is required.
Not all
jurisdictions recognize holographic wills, which are handwritten by the
testator, but even the jurisdictions that do have requirements that must be
fulfilled before the will may be admitted to probate.73 Without the aid of an
attorney, one could imagine the horrible circumstance which could arise if a
decedent attempted to draft their own will disinheriting an abusive heir, but the
will is deemed invalid and therefore is not admitted to probate. Not only is the
intention to disinherit the abusive heir clear, but the decedent tried to express
that intent to the court. Under the current systems, this intent must be ignored
and the invalid will cannot be used to disqualify the abusive heir of his
71. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 170-199. Generally, there are three formalities that
must be met. A will must be in writing, signed by the testator and attested by a specified number
of witnesses. Id. These formalities may sound simple, but jurisdictions very upon what acts will
satisfy each. Id. Compare Potter v. Richardson, 230 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1950) (holding that the
location of the testator’s name was evidence of intent to make a final act, but was not dispositive)
with In re Winter’s Will 98 N.Y.S2d 312 (1950), aff’d without opinion, 98 N.E.2d 477 (N.Y.
1951) (invalidating a will because it did not contain the testator’s signature at the end of the
document). Compare Bain v. Hill, 639 So.2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
exact order of signing is not critical if the testator and the witnesses sign as part of a “single
transaction”) with In re Hartung, 145 A.2d 798 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1958) (rejecting the
single transaction idea).
The UPC and a minority of jurisdictions adhere to a doctrine of “substantial
compliance.” See U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560: 2-503 (2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.2503 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-2-503 (Michie 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (2000). Under “substantial
compliance,” if a will is invalid because of a failure of compliance with all the formalities, the
document may be given effect if “the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute (i) the
decedent’s will. . .” U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993). However, even under this code section a layperson
must be careful. This section opens everything to the scrutiny of the court, not just the formality
that was not met. The proponent must also meet the clear and convincing evidence standard to
validate a will under this section. Id.
72. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 182-89.
73. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 171. Holographic wills do not need to be attested,
but they must be in the handwriting of the testator, signed by the testator and some jurisdictions
require that the writing be dated. Id.
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succession rights. Under the proposed statute this invalid will could be
introduced as evidence and the probate court could at least honor the
decedent’s desire to disinherit that particular heir.74
Even if an abused decedent manages to create a disinheriting will,75 too
often the testator’s attempt is doomed to fail. Probate systems are designed to
protect and support surviving spouses and issue of the testator. Most
jurisdictions have statutory created rights and allowances, which enable these
members of the testator’s family to take against the will or reserve property
from the estate to take care of them.76 Any disinheriting will is trumped on the
rationale that public policy requires the protection of a testator’s surviving
spouse or issue from receiving very little or nothing from the estate.77 Once
again, this protection is misguided in the situation of an abusive heir being
allowed rights in the estate of the deceased that he or she abused.
Yet another problem with relying upon an abused individual to write a will
disinheriting their attacker is that the option is not available to a minor child.
They cannot fulfill the minimum age for the execution of a will.78 Under our
current system of property law, minors can accumulate wealth, but they cannot
devise it through a will. Thereby, making it nearly impossible for a child to
deviate from the default system of intestacy and barring an abuser from his or
her rights of property descent.
The current systems of dealing with the problem of family violence are
inadequate. Right now the general policy is to ignore it and allow victims to
either divorce or disinherit the abuser. This approach, however, does not
recognize the realties of family violence,79 and is only an attempt to keep the
state’s head in the sand when it comes to the ugly issue of family abuse.
III. AUTHOR’S PROPOSAL AND ANALYSIS
The proposed statute against family violence is the following:
(A) If any family member is found, by clear and convincing evidence, to have
committed a pattern of family abuse against the decedent, the abuser is barred

74. The court would not be validating that portion of the improperly executed will; rather the
court would use the document as evidence showing a pattern of abuse.
75. Not an easy task considering that many of the pressures against a victim leaving an
abuser can be applied to a victim creating a disinheriting will. See supra notes 39-51.
76. See supra notes 8-10.
77. See supra notes 8-10.
78. See supra note 64.
79. This approach fails to recognize that family violence can be perpetrated by anyone in the
family. Also, this approach does not consider the incredible forces against a victim speaking out
and taking permanent action against the abuser. See supra notes 39-51. Furthermore, this
approach does not even recognize that it many cases it is not effective against the abuser. The
approach is relying upon the disinheriting will to be given effect in the current probate system.
However, the probate system is designed to protect the abusive heir. See supra notes 8-10.
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from his or her right of inheritance through intestacy, elective share,
homestead allowance, exempt property, any omitted heir status that may exist
and any statutory allowances from the estate of the abused decedent80 so long
as;
i. the violence occurred within five years of the decedent’s death and the
decedent was an adult at the time of the abuse; or
ii. the violence occurred within the lifetime of the decedent and the
decedent was a minor at the time of the abuse.81
(B) The abuser shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes
of section (A).
(C) Definitions
1. “Family abuse” refers to acts of abuse perpetrated against a family
or household member by a family or household member. Acts of
family abuse are the following:
a.

physical harm, bodily injury, or assault;

b.

sexual assault [as defined by the jurisdiction’s appropriate
criminal sexual abuse statute];

c.

infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault; and

d.

terrorizing threats [as defined by the jurisdiction’s applicable
statutes]

Such acts do not have to be the subject of any legal action prior to
the death of the victim:
2. “Family members” means:
a.

spouses and common law or punitive spouses;

b.

parents and children; and

c.

persons related by blood or through adoption.

80. It is important to note that this statute does not bar an heir from receiving property under
a valid will drafted by the decedent. Testamentary freedom is highly regarded in our society. See
Fellows et al., supra note 13. If a person wants to make a devise to an abusive heir, then that
intent should be respected.
81. Subsection (A) (i) and (ii) is based largely upon the proposal found in Preble’s article.
However, that proposal contained evidentiary restrictions that are not included in this proposal
and did not contain the clear and convincing evidentiary standard that is contained in section (A)
of this present proposal. Preble, supra note 15, at 412-17; see infra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text.
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This statute will not only address family violence, but it will do so in a
constitutional method, while protecting both the accused and the accusing
party.
A.

Possible Constitutional Challenges

First, this proposal passes constitutional muster because it is not void for
vagueness or a forfeiture of estate upon criminal conviction. A law cannot be
so vague that “[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.”82 Vagueness in the conduct a law
prescribes “may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning” and may
delegate “basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.”83 This statute defines the term “family abuse” and
refers the reader to any appropriate criminal statute that also contains the
definition thereby giving the reader adequate notice of what acts will trigger a
disqualification of family property rights.84 Furthermore, section (A) defines
the property rights that are affected by this statute and subsection (C)(2)
notifies the reader of the class of individuals that may fall under the provisions
of this law.
A second constitutional challenge may derive from many jurisdictions
having constitutional provisions that forbid a conviction from “corrupting the
blood” of the guilty or causing a “forfeiture of estate.”85 However, slayer
statutes had to hurdle these same constitutional provisions.86 A handful of
courts struck down the slayer statutes on the grounds of these constitutional
provisions.87 The purpose prohibiting the state from enacting laws that would
take a criminals property rights was to protect innocent family members from
the loss of family property and inheritance rights.88 Unlike the laws that
worried the state legislatures to the point of adopting these prohibitions, this
proposed statute “would only require that the abuser forfeit certain inheritance
interests in the decedent’s estate.”89 All other property rights possessed by the
abuser would go unaffected.

82. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
83. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).
84. See proposed statute section (C)(1).
85. See, e.g., AK. CONST. art. I, § 15; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9;
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 831-3 (Michie 2000); IND. CONST. art. I, § 30; NEB. CONST.art. I, § 15;
ME. CONST. art. I, § 11.
86. See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 538-45 (1986).
87. See, e.g., Hagen v. Cone, 94 S.E. 602 (Ga. App. 1917); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E.
785 (Ill. 1914); Wilson v. Randolf, 261 P. 654 (Nev. 1927).
88. Fellows, supra note 86, at 540.
89. Preble, supra note 15, at 421; see proposed statute section (A).
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The realities associated with family violence suggest that this statute would
not be deemed a forfeiture of estate. Section (B) of the proposed statute
ensures that the property rights will pass to the heirs of the decedent, who are
probably the heirs of the abuser. Thus, “by forfeiting the abuser’s rights and
distributing the property to the remaining family members of the decedent, the
proposed reform would operate to divert additional property to the non-abusive
heirs, rather than taking it from them.”90
B.

The Protections Offered by the Proposed Statute

The proposed statute protects the accused abuser by the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard and the five-year statutory limit of admissible
incidents of abuse while the decedent was an adult. A high burden of proof
exists because the statute requires an accuser to prove clearly and convincing
to the court the existence of a pattern of family violence.91 This evidentiary
standard makes sure that strong evidence of incidents of family violence is
presented to the court and the word “pattern” included in the statute ensures
that relatively minor and isolated incidents of abuse will not be enough to
allow the court to bar an accused from his or her inheritance rights.92
Furthermore, the five-year statutory period prevents remote acts of violence to
haunt the accused after the decedent’s death.93 This provision recognizes that
couples may go to therapy and work through their problems. This statute is not
designed to prevent or to discourage the hard work and love it took to stop the
pattern of family violence that had developed.
The accused is not allowed the five-year protection when the abuse
occurred while the decedent was a minor.94 The reasoning for this stricter rule
is to “better protect the most vulnerable victims of family violence and to send
a clear message to child abusers.”95 Acts of child abuse can have everlasting

90. Preble, supra note 15, at 421.
91. See proposed statute section (A).
92. Id.
93. See proposed statute section (A) (i).
94. See proposed statute section (A) (ii).
95. Preble, supra note 15, at 416-17. It was proposed that a pattern of family violence while
the decedent was a minor had to be proven by court documents, which showed “(i) a conviction
for family violence by the abuser against the decedent while the decedent was a minor; (ii)
actions by governmental authorities to protect the decedent from the abuser; or (iii) a tort
judgment against the abuser in favor of the decedent for family violence committed by the abuser
against the decedent while the decedent was a minor.” Id. The rationale of this evidentiary
restriction was to ensure that “clear and highly probable evidence to effect forfeiture.” Id.
However, this purpose can be achieved without limiting forfeiture only to situations where legal
or governmental action was taken. The clear and convincing evidentiary standard provides
practically the same amount of protection to the accused, but also allows the court to examine
more evidence of abuse.
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effects upon a child’s development both socially and mentally.96 The proposed
family violence statute attempts to make an abuser accountable for their
actions against children longer than five years.
The proposed family violence statute also provides protections for
individuals making allegations of an existing pattern of abuse. Although the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard places a higher burden of proof on
parties accusing a family member of violence, the standard allows the statute to
permit a wide range of admissible evidence. A past proposal limited
admissible evidence to “existing civil or criminal records of the benefiting
family members.”97 It was argued that this limitation upon admissible
evidence was appropriate because the lesser culpability, compared to an abuser
who’s acts of violence directly lead to the death of the decedent,98 required “a
higher threshold for the loss of the property interest.”99 However, this
limitation on evidence admissible to show a past pattern of family violence
completely ignores the reality that many incidents of violence go unreported to
the authorities100 and many never lead to a conviction, arrest or an issuance of
an order for protection on behalf of the decedent.101 Limiting admissible
evidence to only these instances excludes medical reports, events witnessed by
friends and family, and any otherwise admissible evidence that was not
involved in a legal action. With the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
protecting the accused, the family members benefiting from this statute are
allowed to introduce evidence that may be less reliable and persuasive than

It is important to note that the clear and convincing evidence rule is still applied to abuse
involving minors because the accused still deserves protection from the possibility of false or
unwarranted accusations. See proposed statute section (A).
96. See supra note 27.
97. Preble, supra note 15, at 414.
98. The proposed family violence statute does not apply to cases where the family violence
was the direct cause of the decedent’s death. See proposed statute section (A). That situation
would be left for either the State’s slayer statute or, if none exits, then to the State’s common law.
99. Preble, supra note 15, at 415. “Where homicide is involved, there is a stronger
justification for considering any and all evidence of family violence which possibly led to the
killing.” Id.
100. A victim of spousal abuse is likely to complain about everything else, but the violence.
HARAWAY ET AL., supra note 2, at 36. “Estimates from [the] National Crime Victimization
Survey data indicate that only 56 percent of battering incidents are reported to the police. Other
research has estimated that as few as 7 percent to 14 percent of battering incidents are reported.
Nat’l Research Council, Criminal Justice Measures, in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 68,
70.
101. Stalens et al., supra note 34, at 18-22; Albert R. Roberts, The Police Response, in
BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 27, at 32, 32-40; Nat’l Research Council, supra note 96, at 68-74;
Johanna Shargel, Federal Protection: The Violence Against Women Act, in BATTERED WOMEN,
supra note 27, at 75, 75-81.
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existing civil or criminal records, but may be the only evidence available to
prove a past pattern of family violence.102
Prohibiting the inheritance rights of an abusive heir can be done in a
method that is both constitutional and realistic. Issues of practicality and
privacy remain to be addressed, however, these arguments have already begun
to fail in practice. Courts routinely peer behind the walls of privacy, which
historically surrounded the family.103
IV. SUPPORT FOR REFORM AND GETTING BEYOND THE SANCTITY OF
MARRIAGE
The proposed statute in this article is designed to address the realities of
family violence. One reality that must be observed is the corrosion of the legal
sanctity of marriage, which existed in the past to protect the family from state
intrusion.104 An abuser can no longer hide under a shield provided by the
family that he or she is destroying. There are several areas where the law and
the courts are refusing to be prevented from applying justice just because it
requires looking into the private lives of a family.
As discussed above, slayer statutes now exist in many jurisdictions.105
These statutes give no regard to the sanctity of marriage. They are designed to

102. See supra note 101.
103. See infra notes 105, 107, 111.
104. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (“our decisions establish that the Constitution the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925)
(recognizing there is a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter). But see supra
note 56, 107, 111, 130-135, 141 and accompanying text.
105. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (2000) (barring an heir or devisee “who feloniously and
intentionally kills the decedent”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (2000) (viewing the slayer as
predeceasing the decedent “as to property which would have passed from the estate of the
decedent to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by
statutory right as surviving spouse”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 941 (West 2000) (“a successor
shall be deemed unworthy if he is convicted of a crime involving the intentional killing, or
attempted killing, of the decedent or is judicially determined to have participated in the
intentional, unjustified killing, or attempted killing, of the decedent”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit
18-A, § 2-803 (West 1999) (“estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the
decedent”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.2-803 (West 2000) (“a surviving spouse, heir or devisee
who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will
or under this article, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s or child’s
share, homestead, exempt property and a family allowance, and the estate of the decedent passes
as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or
for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent”); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2354 (2000) (“a surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally
kills or aids and abets the killing of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or
this article, and the estate of the decedent passes as if such spouse, heir, or devisee had
predeceased the decedent”).
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punish the murderer and prevent a wrongdoer from profiting from their
wrongs.106 This notion of justice was not created by the legislatures when they
drafted their slayer statutes, but rather it was developed in the common law and
many jurisdictions without the aid of statutory directives have denied
succession rights to killer heirs.107 There is a difference, however, between an
heir intentionally killing the decedent and an heir committing a pattern of
violence against the decedent. The killer heir intentionally caused the death of
the decedent and therefore directly led to the existence of the killer’s
succession rights. This close relationship between a killer’s misconduct and
his property rights may create a stronger “moral imperative of preventing a
killer from succeeding to the victim’s property”108 than in the case of abusive
heir attempting to receive his inheritance, but it provides support for a statute
that looks beyond misplaced notions of family sanctity and punishes
irreprehensible conduct.
Some jurisdictions bar succession rights based on particular acts of
misconduct.109 These acts of misconduct do not include incidents of family
violence, but they do require courts to determine if an individual has in effect
abandoned or neglected his or her spouse and family.110 Again, these
determinations often require probate courts to hold trials examining extrinsic
evidence regarding the family relationship.111

106. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 462.
107. See, e.g., Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1952) (treating the killer as a
constructive trustee, even though no slayer statute existed in New Jersey at this time, because a
“wrongdoer shall not enrich himself by his inequity at the expense of an innocent person.”); Perry
v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908) (“this construction of the existing
statute. . .prohibiting a murdered from inheriting from his victim, does not violate our
constitutional provision. . .there is no forfeiture of an estate which he has, but is simply
preventing him from acquiring property in an unauthorized and unlawful way, i.e., by murder.”);
In re Tyler, 250 P. 456, 457 (Wash. 1926) (“it is so offensive to good conscience, repugnant to
justice, and revolting to the mind of every right thinking person that one should come into court
with bloody hands and receive as it were a reward for his iniquity that we cannot conceive that
the Legislature composed of persons of good sense and integrity should have intended. . .that
such consummation could be accomplished.”).
108. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 462.
109. See supra note 56.
110. Id.
111. See In re Jelloch, 854 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (examining the family
environment closely to determine if the decedent could “reasonably have been expected to live
with [her husband]); In re Cochran, 738 A.2d 1029 (Pa. Super Ct. 1999) (holding that a protection
from abuse order may establish grounds for forfeiture of the husbands spousal share); In re
Fulton, 619 A.2d 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (examining the backgrounds and lifestyles of the
married couple, the events leading to the marriage ceremony, facts regarding wife’s desertion of
her husband, and Mrs. Fulton’s funeral to determine if there was adequate evidence to support the
Orphans’ Court judge’s finding that the separation was consensual between Mr. Fulton and Mrs.
Fulton.).
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Although a minority of states bar inheritance based upon particular acts of
misconduct, none of these states address the issue of family abuse explicitly.112
However, a doctrine within these jurisdictions may be interpreting acts of
abuse as “constructive abandonment.”113 The rationale is that because of the
acts of abuse which existed, the “decedent could not have reasonably have
been expected to live with [the abuser].”114 Many of these statutes barring
succession rights focus upon abandonment of the decedent spouse.115 Since
the abuser forced the decedent to leave the family, these acts constitute
abandoning the decedent.116 The state statutes barring property rights for acts
of misconduct are worded in a way that is conducive to this interpretation.117

112. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 7, at 81-82; see supra note 54. California examines
acts of physical violence as it relates to an elder or dependent adult but it does not allow for an
inquiry into acts of abuse between other members of the family. See CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. §
259 (West 1999); see also supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Jellech, 854 S.W.2d at 828; Gove v. Crosby, 102 A.2d 905 (N.H. 1954)
(interpreting the statutory language “living apart” as describing “a condition of ‘isolation as
regards action, function or associations’ which might exist between a husband and wife while
occupying the same dwelling,” but requiring a new trial to examine the marital relationship after
the wife’s return to her battering husband). See also Cochran, 738 A.2d at 1029. The court in
Cochran did not use the term “constructive abandonment.” Id. However, the court concluded
“the nature of the deserting spouse’s conduct, either before or after the separation, and the extent
to which it is inconsistent with the marital relationship, is dispositive of whether the separation is
a willful and malicious desertion within the meaning of the forfeiture statute.” Id. at 1032. The
court names the heir’s absence from the marital home as a “de facto desertion.” Id. at 1032-33.
This case may not be seen as following the “constructive abandonment” doctrine, but it is very
similar in analysis. The court is responding to the petitioner’s argument that he never intended to
abandon the marital relationship. Id. at 1031-32. The court gets around this argument by
recognizing that husband’s actions towards the decedent forced him out of the spousal
relationship and that this forced absence will qualify under the statute barring spousal inheritance
rights for abandonment. Id. at 1032-33.
114. Jellech, 854 S.W.2d at 831. It is important to note that in Jellech it was entered into
evidence without objection that the husband was verbally abusive to the decedent,
noncommunicative and unaffectionate. Id. at 829-31. No acts of physical abuse were recognized
by the court.
115. See supra note 56.
116. In Jellech, the court examined thoroughly the marital lives of the decedent and her
husband. Jellech, 854 S.W.2d at 828-29. The court recognized that since the decedent actually
left the home, it was her actions and intentions that they were interpreting. Id. at 829. However,
it was the husband’s acts, which drove the decedent from the home and marriage. Id. at 831.
“The evidence of his abusive conduct, in conjunction with the evidence of his other actions, was
such that the trial court could conclude that decedent could not reasonably have been expected to
live with the petitioner.” Id.
117. See, e.g., EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (a)(5) (West 2000) (spouse barred if
spouse “abandoned the deceased spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of
death”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:19 (2000) (spouse barred if “at the time of the death of
either the husband or wife, the decedent was justifiably living apart from the surviving husband or
wife because such survivor was or had been guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for
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The “constructive abandonment” doctrine has yet to develop into the tool
against family violence that the proposed statue would be, because the
language of a misconduct statute, which was never designed to handle the
problem of family violence, restricts the scope of the doctrine. First, since the
statute applies only to spouses,118 children and other family members outside
the decedent’s household are outside the scope of the doctrine. The proposed
statute is specifically designed to address abuse from all members of the
family.119 Second, the proposed statute clearly defines the acts of abuse.120
The “constructive abandonment” doctrine leaves this up to the complete
discretion of the particular court. An effective approach against family
violence must apply to wide variety of acts and situations. Although the
proposed statute allows for courts to interpret the severity and frequency of
abusive acts, the statute lists the type of acts that will be examined.121
The “constructive abandonment” doctrine, however, does provide
considerable support for the proposed statute against family violence. Not
only does it allow a court to punish patterns of abuse by looking at the
abandoning effect it may have had upon the family,122 it also does not appear
to require an abused decedent to actually leave the abuser, under certain
circumstances.123 The “constructive abandonment” doctrine has its roots in
family law and abandonment grounds for divorce.124 Courts hearing a petition
divorce”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-1 (a)(3)(b) (2000) (spouse barred if “willfully and without
just cause abandons and refuses to live with the other spouse and is not living with the other
spouse at the time of such spouse’s death”); see supra note 56.
118. See supra note 56.
119. See proposed statute section (C)(2).
120. See proposed statute section (C)(1).
121. Id. Courts are given flexibility by the term “pattern.” See proposed statute section (A).
Although the statute defines what specific acts that are to be examined, courts are allowed to
examine the facts to determine if the statute should apply to that particular circumstance.
122. See supra notes 111, 116.
123. Jellech involved a spouse who did actually leave her abuser. See Jellech, 854 S.W.2d at
829. This is a case where constructive abandonment is easily applied. The abusive spouse’s
actions are the cause for the abandonment by the other spouse from the family home. See supra
notes 114-116. However, in situations where the abused spouse does not leave the home and
continued to remain with the abuser, the argument of constructive abandonment is tougher to
make. Since the intent to cease the marital relationship is the essence of spousal abandonment, an
argument must be made that the intent still existed after the couple continued to cohabitate. See
Gove, 102 A.2d 905; see also infra notes 128, 129 and accompanying text.
124. See Diemer v. Diemer, 168 N.E.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (finding that spouse
constructively abandoned her husband by refusing sexual relations even though her actions were
without malice and the couple still lived together in the same household); Bruner v. Bruner, 135
N.E. 578 (Ind. 1922) (granting divorce on the grounds that constructive abandonment does not
require a spouse to physically leave the home where the couple remained cohabited). See also
47A NYJUR § 1925 (West, 2nd ed. 1995) (“the spouse remaining at home may be guilty of
abandonment where his or her conduct justifies the other spouse in departing from the marital
home or terminating the marital relationship; this is referred to as constructive abandonment”).
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for divorce rationalized finding the existence of spousal abandonment where
the couple remained under one roof by finding “that appellant and appellee had
not lived and cohabitated together as man and wife for several years prior to, at
the time of, nor since the filing of her petition.”125 This rationale can be
applied to the constructive abandonment doctrine if one views abandonment as
requiring an intent of one spouse “to give up completely the relation of
husband and wife with no intention to resume it.”126 The basis for constructive
abandonment is that this requisite intent can be inferred from the spouse’s
conduct.”127 Through the abusive actions of a spouse, intent to abandon the
other is inferred.
Although an examination of the home may turn up intent by the abusive
spouse to abandon the spousal relationship, in the case of family violence and
continued cohabitation more evidence of the intent may be needed. Statutes
barring property descent for acts of spousal misconduct have exceptions for
couples that voluntarily reconcile and resume cohabitation.128 Under the
“constructive abandonment” doctrine a victim may not be required to leave the
household and the abuse, but there exists a high hurdle to clear in proving that
the couple did not kiss and make up after the violence occurred.129
The “constructive abandonment” doctrine does provide strong support for
the proposed statute against family violence. It is an example of courts getting
around state legislature’s unwillingness to address family violence, by looking
at acts of violence under the existing scheme. However, the doctrine is too
limited in its scope and practicability to be effective against the complex
problem of family violence.
Another support for the proposed family violence statute is California’s
statute barring any person from taking property under the laws of intestacy, a
will, or a trust, for acts of violence as well as other forms of misconduct.130 An
heir is disqualified if it can be proven by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
he is liable for physical abuse upon a person who was an elder or a dependent
adult; (2) he acted in bad faith and (3) was “reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or
125. Bruner, 135 N.E. at 579. “It cannot be expected in all cases that the plaintiff upon
bringing an action for a divorce will abandon her home, to which she has as much right as the
defendant, and desert her children, to whom she has an equal right, and be compelled to maintain
herself separate and apart from her husband pending the suit. She may have no other home and
be entirely without means of supporting herself elsewhere.” Denison v. Denison, 30 P. 1100,
1101 (Wash. 1892).
126. In re Clark, 213 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
127. See Jellech, 854 S.W.2d at 830.
128. See supra note 56.
129. In Gove, the court ordered a new trial to examine the marital relationship, which existed
at the time of the decedent’s death. See Gove, 102 A.2d at 907. It is important to note, however,
that even though a further examination was needed, constructive abandonment was not precluded
by the battered spouse’s return to her violent husband. Id.
130. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2000).
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malicious in the commission of these acts.”131 Furthermore, it must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent, “at the time the acts
occurred and thereafter until the time of his or her death,” to have been
“substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud
or undue influence.”132 At first glance, this statute may seem like its objective
was to address family violence, however, the statute is too limited to be
effective in that area. It applies only to a small portion of the family133 and
even then it is limited to individuals who are very susceptible to fraud or undue
influence regarding their financial well-being.134
The California statute, however, does provide a great amount of support
for the proposed statute contained in this article. It uses a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard like the one included in the proposal. Furthermore, an
individual must only be found liable for physical abuse, neglect or fiduciary
abuse. No prior convictions are needed to prove these acts.135 This statute
may not be very applicable to the issue of family violence, but it is a giant step
forward in the disqualification of an heir’s rights of succession.136
Another area where courts have examined the relationships within the
family very intensively is the area of legitimizing children and determining
inheritance rights arising from, through or to a child. Although the UPC takes
the position that a child is legally the child of his or her natural parents
regardless of their marital status,137 many jurisdictions view the child as the
child of only the mother in the absence of a valid marriage.138 In these
jurisdictions, however, paternity may be established by other means139 and this
requires a court to examine private matters inside the family.140

131. Id.
132. Id. § (a)(4).
133. Statute only protects the elderly or dependant adults. Id. § (a) (1).
134. Only elderly or dependent adults who are “substantially” unable to manage their
financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence fall under the people protected by this
statute. See supra note 115.
135. “Any person found liable under subdivision (a) [acts of fraud, physical abuse, neglect,
etc.] or convicted under subdivision (b) [violation of section 236 of the California penal code]
shall not receive any property, damages, or costs that are awarded to the decedent’s estate in an
action described in subdivision (a) or (b), whether that person’s entitlement is under a will, a
trust, or the laws of intestacy. § 259 (c).
136. The statute does not limit itself only to heirs of the decedent. Id. § (a) (“any person shall
be deemed to have predeceased a decedent”).
137. See U.P.C. § 2-114 (1993) (an individual is the child of his [or her] natural parents,
regardless of their marital status. The parent and child relationship may be established under [the
Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory reference]).
138. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 (2000).
139. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (2000.) (“person born out of wedlock is a child of the
mother. . .that person is also the child of the father, if; (a) the natural parents participated in a
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is
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Even if a parent-child relationship has been established, many jurisdictions
will not allow a parent or their kindred to inherit from or through a child if the
parent has not “openly treated the kid as his” and/or “refused to support the
child.”141 This determination forces the court to examine the everyday lives of
the parent and child. Particular instances must be examined to determine the
true nature of the relationship. This examination is very similar to the one
required by the proposed family abuse statute. Evidence of particular instances
of violence will be presented to the probate court for its determination if a
pattern of family violence did exist, which falls under the statute as requiring a
bar on succession rights.
All of these areas of law require probate courts to examine the family
environment in much the same way as the proposed family violence statute.
At first glance a statute requiring a probate court to determine if a pattern of
family abuse existed may seem impractical and too demanding upon the
courts, but courts are already performing similar examinations in other
contexts.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past, family violence was viewed as a “private matter,” which was
no place for the courts. That approach failed and today family violence is
almost out of control. It is time state legislatures completely remove their
heads from the nineteenth-century sand. Criminal statutes have been put in
place, but its time to reinforce them with probate laws that bar succession
rights of family abusers. The proposed statute is not requiring the probate

void; or (b) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is
established thereafter by clear and convincing proof”).
140. See e.g., House v. Campbell, 628 So.2d 448 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that although
the father of decedent often failed to contribute to child’s support, he did not “refuse” to do so
such that a statutory determination of paternity would be ineffective); Patterson v. Patterson, 116
So. 734, 735 (Miss. 1928) (holding that because father did not treat the decedent as his own son,
neither the father or the decedent’s half brother could inherit from the boy).
141. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (2) (b) (2000) (“paternity established under this
paragraph is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child
unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child”);
MO. REV. STAT.§ 474.060 (2) (2) (2000) (requiring the father or his kindred to have “openly
treated the child as his” and to have not refused support of the child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2114 (C) (Michie 2000) (precluding inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or
his kindred “unless that natural parent has openly treated his child as his and has not refused to
support the child”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105 (2) (b) (2000) (“in no event shall a parent be
permitted to inherit through intestate succession until all child support arrearages together with
interest thereon at the legal rate of interest computed from the date each payment was due have
been paid in full to the parent ordered to receive such support or to such parent’s estate if
deceased.”).
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courts to do anything different from what they are already doing in other
contexts. The only thing stopping them is the implementation of the statutes.
The important thing to remember is that to successfully attack a problem,
one must first understand it. The trait that makes family abuse such a tough
adversary is that it uses a shroud of silence to protect itself. Any statute
attacking family violence must somehow get passed this silence to hear the
victim’s stories. The proposed family violence statute’s clear and convincing
evidentiary standard does this, and it does it in a method that provides
protections for all involved. Society has always demanded that victims seek
help, but it never understood just how tough it was. It is the twenty-first
century, and it is time for the legal system to lend a hand to those victims.
Probate courts, by their nature, are limited in protections they can provide a
victim of family violence, but the proposed family abuse statute punishes
attackers and provides for the loving family members from the abused
decedent’s estate. Indeed, they are victims too from the attacker’s abuse and
can benefit from a probate court applying justice.
THOMAS H. SHEPHERD*

*

J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2002; B.A., University of Missouri,
1998. The author would like to thank Tom and Jan Shepherd for their support, never ending
patients and free laundry services.

